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Dihan Pool's avatar

“[control] comes from shaping the conditions under which decisions can occur.” Humans architect the music to which AI plays the tune. For now, at least. Great article.

Aaron Sempf's avatar

That’s a great way of putting it.

The important part is that the “music” exists before the system starts playing. Once decisions are already in motion, it’s too late to conduct, you’re just listening to what happened.

Architecting the conditions is what makes autonomy survivable. Everything else is commentary after the fact.

Appreciate your reflection.

Lance Clarke's avatar

When systems behave unpredictably, the instinct is to slow them down: add a review, insert a checkpoint, put a human back in the loop.

It feels like control. It isn’t.

Human-in-the-loop is not a control strategy. It’s a compensation for missing structure.

Modern systems are already autonomous decisions are distributed, context is partial, actions are asynchronous, and outcomes emerge from interaction, not intent. Inserting a human checkpoint doesn’t re-centralize control; it adds latency to a system whose defining property is speed.

At scale, humans don’t become governors. They become bottlenecks or rubber stamps. Often with responsibility but no real authority.

Risk isn’t eliminated. It’s relocated—from architecture to discretion. From structure to judgment. That’s flexible, but it’s also unscalable and unauditable.

Control isn’t achieved by reviewing decisions after they’re made. It comes from shaping the conditions under which decisions are allowed to occur—boundaries, constraints, and explicit authority.

Once autonomy is acknowledged, the question isn’t whether control is possible.

It’s whether we’re willing to design it.

Doctrine on this distinction: https://www.aice.technology

Lance Clarke's avatar

Appreciate that, and to be clear, this isn’t just an articulation exercise.

This distinction only matters if it can be engineered, and that’s what we’ve been focused on: designing control before execution, as an explicit architectural layer rather than a procedural afterthought.

In practice, that means intelligence is free to reason, generate, and propose, but execution is gated by a separate authority plane that enforces boundaries, scope, and arbitration at runtime. Not review after the fact. Not discretionary checkpoints. Structural constraints that exist before action is possible.

That’s the difference between relocating risk and actually containing it.

We’re currently testing this in live systems precisely because, as you point out, once decisions are distributed and asynchronous, latency masquerading as governance collapses under speed. Auditability disappears. Responsibility diffuses.

Control has to be designed where it can still act, upstream of execution.

That’s the core premise behind AICE, and why we think architecture, not policy, becomes the primary control surface as autonomy scales.

For anyone interested in the underlying doctrine and design assumptions:

https://www.aice.technology

Aaron Sempf's avatar

This is a very clean articulation of the distinction.

Especially the point about risk being relocated rather than removed, from structure into discretion. That’s exactly where things become flexible but unscalable, and why auditability quietly disappears.

Once decisions are distributed and asynchronous, adding review steps doesn’t restore authority. It just adds latency to a system whose defining property is speed.

The hard shift is accepting that control has to be designed before execution, as boundaries and explicit authority, not retrofitted through checkpoints after the fact.

Lance Clarke's avatar

Yes, and one clarification on the last point.

“Designed before execution” doesn’t mean existing systems are locked out. Retrofitting is possible today, provided control is introduced as a separate authority layer rather than embedded back into intelligence or process.

That’s the distinction AICE makes: execution authority can be inserted alongside existing systems without rebuilding them, by externalizing permissioning, arbitration, and action boundaries.

Where the paradigm shift comes in is forward-looking. Future systems won’t treat control as something to be added or enforced after the fact. They’ll be built with explicit authority separation from the start, the same way we now assume memory isolation or access control by default.

So retrofitting is a bridge.

The architecture shift is the destination.

Once that separation is made explicit, both legacy and next-gen systems become governable at scale.